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Agent Governance Toolkit

Ship agents to production without losing sleep

🚀 Quick Start · 📋 Specifications · 📦 PyPI · 📝 Changelog

[!IMPORTANT] Public Preview -- production-quality public preview releases. May have breaking changes before GA.

Policy enforcement, identity, sandboxing, and SRE for autonomous AI agents. One pip install, any framework.

The Problem

Your AI agents call tools, browse the web, query databases, and delegate to other agents. Once deployed, they make decisions autonomously. You need answers to three questions:

1. Is this action allowed? An agent with access to send_email and query_database should not be able to drop_table. OAuth scopes and IAM roles control which services an agent can reach, not what it does once connected.

2. Which agent did this? In a multi-agent system, five agents might share a single API key. When something goes wrong, "an agent did it" is not an incident response.

3. Can you prove what happened? Auditors and regulators need tamper-evident records of every decision: what policy was active, what the agent requested, and why it was allowed or denied.

Prompt-level safety ("please follow the rules") is not a control surface. It is a polite request to a stochastic system. OWASP LLM01:2025 states this explicitly: "it is unclear if there are fool-proof methods of prevention for prompt injection." The published numbers back this up. Andriushchenko et al. (ICLR 2025) report 100% attack success rate on GPT-4o, GPT-3.5, Claude 3, and Llama-3 using adaptive attacks with logprob access and suffix optimization, evaluated against the JailbreakBench benchmark (Chao et al., NeurIPS 2024). Microsoft's own AI Red Teaming Agent formalizes Attack Success Rate (ASR), the rate of policy violations under adversarial input, as the canonical metric for this class of failure. Lessons from Red Teaming 100 Generative AI Products reinforces the point: "mitigations do not eliminate risk entirely" and red teaming must be a continuous process because model-layer defenses are probabilistic by construction.

AGT does not try to win that fight inside the prompt. Every tool call, message send, and delegation is intercepted in deterministic application code before the model's intent reaches the wire. Actions the AGT kernel denies are not "unlikely." They are structurally impossible. That is the difference between asking an agent to behave and making it incapable of misbehaving.

Quick Start

Prerequisites: Python 3.10+

pip install agent-governance-toolkit[full]

For Claude Code, add AGT as a plugin marketplace and install the governance plugin:

/plugin marketplace add microsoft/agent-governance-toolkit
/plugin install agt-governance@agent-governance-toolkit

Govern any tool function in two lines:

from agentmesh.governance import govern

safe_tool = govern(my_tool, policy="policy.yaml")   # every call checked, logged, enforced

That's it. safe_tool evaluates your YAML policy on every call, logs the decision, and raises GovernanceDenied if the action is blocked.

# policy.yaml
apiVersion: governance.toolkit/v1
name: production-policy
default_action: allow
rules:
  - name: block-destructive
    condition: "action.type in ['drop', 'delete', 'truncate']"
    action: deny
    description: "Destructive operations require human approval"

  - name: require-approval-for-send
    condition: "action.type == 'send_email'"
    action: require_approval
    approvers: ["security-team"]

>>> safe_tool(action="read", table="users")
{'table': 'users', 'rows': 42}

>>> safe_tool(action="drop", table="users")
GovernanceDenied: Action denied by policy rule 'block-destructive':
  Destructive operations require human approval

Or use the full PolicyEvaluator API for programmatic control:

from agent_os.policies import (
    PolicyEvaluator, PolicyDocument, PolicyRule,
    PolicyCondition, PolicyAction, PolicyOperator, PolicyDefaults
)

evaluator = PolicyEvaluator(policies=[PolicyDocument(
    name="my-policy", version="1.0",
    defaults=PolicyDefaults(action=PolicyAction.ALLOW),
    rules=[PolicyRule(
        name="block-dangerous-tools",
        condition=PolicyCondition(
            field="tool_name",
            operator=PolicyOperator.IN,
            value=["execute_code", "delete_file"]
        ),
        action=PolicyAction.DENY, priority=100,
    )],
)])

result = evaluator.evaluate({"tool_name": "web_search"})    # Allowed
result = evaluator.evaluate({"tool_name": "delete_file"})   # Blocked

TypeScript

import { PolicyEngine } from "@microsoft/agent-governance-sdk";

const engine = new PolicyEngine([
  { action: "web_search", effect: "allow" },
  { action: "shell_exec", effect: "deny" },
]);
engine.evaluate("web_search"); // "allow"
engine.evaluate("shell_exec"); // "deny"

.NET

using AgentGovernance;
using AgentGovernance.Extensions.ModelContextProtocol;
using AgentGovernance.Policy;

var kernel = new GovernanceKernel(new GovernanceOptions
{
    PolicyPaths = new() { "policies/default.yaml" },
});
var result = kernel.EvaluateToolCall("did:mesh:agent-1", "web_search",
    new() { ["query"] = "latest AI news" });

// MCP server integration
builder.Services.AddMcpServer()
    .WithGovernance(options => options.PolicyPaths.Add("policies/mcp.yaml"));

Rust

use agent_governance::{AgentMeshClient, ClientOptions};

let client = AgentMeshClient::new("my-agent").unwrap();
let result = client.execute_with_governance("data.read", None);
assert!(result.allowed);

Go

import agentmesh "github.com/microsoft/agent-governance-toolkit/agent-governance-golang"

client, _ := agentmesh.NewClient("my-agent",
    agentmesh.WithPolicyRules([]agentmesh.PolicyRule{
        {Action: "data.read", Effect: agentmesh.Allow},
        {Action: "*", Effect: agentmesh.Deny},
    }),
)
result := client.ExecuteWithGovernance("data.read", nil)

CLI tools:

agt doctor                                        # check installation
agt verify                                        # OWASP compliance check
agt verify --evidence ./agt-evidence.json --strict # fail CI on weak evidence
agt red-team scan ./prompts/ --min-grade B         # prompt injection audit
agt lint-policy policies/                          # validate policy files

Full walkthrough: quickstart.md -- zero to governed agents in 5 minutes. 🌍 Also in: 日本語 | 简体中文 | 한국어

How It Works

Agent ──► Policy Engine ──► Identity ──► Audit Log
            (YAML/OPA/Cedar)  (SPIFFE/DID/mTLS)  (Tamper-evident)
                 │                                      │
                 ├── Allowed ──► Tool executes           │
                 └── Denied  ──► GovernanceDenied        │
                                                        ▼
                                                 Decision Record

Every layer is optional. Start with govern() and add layers as your risk profile grows. Most teams run policy enforcement + audit logging and never need the full stack.

Packages

Additional Capabilities

Install

All five language SDKs implement core governance (policy, identity, trust, audit). Python has the full stack. Copilot CLI and Claude Code are first-party developer surfaces built on the TypeScript SDK. See Language Package Matrix for detailed per-language coverage.

As of v4.1.0, 45 packages have been consolidated into 5 top-level distributions: